Vandaag is de website van het Britse defensiebdrijf Britam gehackt. Er is een grote hoeveelheid vertrouwelijk materiaal naar buiten gesluisd en breed over het internet gezaaid. Wij kregen een mail waarin over deze hackersactie bericht werd, met als bijlage een groot deel van de documenten. In deze documenten kun je onder andere lezen welke bedrijven, waaronder Nokia/Siemens en natuurlijk Haliburton in coöperatie met Shell, door Britam gecontrcteerd zijn om deelgenoot te zijn in het smerige oorlogsspel dat men in het Midden-Oosten aan het spelen is.

Hieronder de mail:

Hoi,

Er heeft vanochtend een Hack plaatsgevonden bij Britam, ik weet uiteraard niet door wie, een particulier militair orgaan van het VK(Great Britain). Dit zal jullie vast ook niet ontgaan zijn.
Hierin wordt duidelijk hoe een aanval op het midden oosten gaat plaatsvinden. En hoe vies dit spelletjes gespeeld worden. We wisten dit uiteraard allemaal wel, maar nu staat t zwart op wit, van de betrokken zelf. Dit is nog maar een klein gedeelte van t geheel en heb helaas ook niet alles kunnen dowloaden….helaas, maar toch nog 2/3.
Wat ik stuur is slechts een klein gedeelte. Mocht er meer belangstelling zijn, dan hoor ik dit graag.

Onder deze mail was een intern bedrijfsbericht meegestuurd:

Het volgende zijn de koppen van dit message/rfc822 bericht. Datum: Mon, 24 Dec 2012 15:57:16 -0000 Onderwerp: Syrian Issue Van: “David Goulding” <dgoulding@britamdefence.com> Aan: “‘Phillip Doughty’” <pdoughty@britamdefence.com>

4 onbenoemd [multipart/related] 2,32 KB

Alternatieve onderdelen voor deze sectie: onbenoemd [text/plain] 1,08 KB Klik HIER om HTML inhoud in een apart scherm te bekijken. Dit HTML bericht bevat afbeeldingen. Geblokkeerde afbeeldingen verschijnen als volgt: Klik hier om de afbeeldingen weer te geven. Phil We’ve got a new offer.  It’s about Syria again. Qataris propose an attractive deal and swear that the idea is approved by Washington. We’ll have to deliver a CW to Homs, a Soviet origin g-shell from Libya similar to those that Assad should have. They want us to deploy our Ukrainian personnel that should speak Russian and make a video record. Frankly, I don’t think it’s a good idea but the sums proposed are enormous.  Your opinion? Kind regards David David Goulding | Business Development Director Marvic House, Bishop’s Road, London, SW6 7AD, United Kingdom t :+ 44 (0)20 7610 0111 dl:+44 (0)1522 754 361 m: + 44 (0)7817 981 237 e : dgoulding@britamdefence.com | www.britamdefence.com The information contained in this email may be confidential and is for the exclusive use of the addressee. If you are not the addressee the retention, distribution or copying of this email is prohibited. If you are not the addressee please advise the sender and delete immediately.

Met name één van de meegestuurde documenten geeft een kijkje in de keuken ca deze smerige oorlogsmachine, die zich niet druk maakt om collateral damage onder de burgerbevolking.

SECRET FOR TRAINING

Copy __ of __ Copies

SANG HQ

G2

Intelligence Plans and Operations Department

261200 September 2012

Annex B (Intelligence) to OPLAN (Ruhayyat) 1433H-1a

References: Operations Maps of OPLAN (Ruhayyat)

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Local

1. 1.             Situation:

Red country continues with its Military Activities in the Regional and International Seas on the Arabian Gulf (Eastern Region) to impose its Military, Political and Media Control on its Neighboring Countries in many ways, the latest problem was the Continuous Diplomatic and Media Escalation which resulted to mass its Forces and execute Military Maneuvers in the gulf water near Blue country. The Red Country conducted Landing Operation in Division Size on (Al-Jubail, Uqair and Dammam) Coasts under Air Coverage. 4^th Joined Arms Army is in position facing Eastern Region Sector (MODA Forces) there’s Possibility of 18^th BTG Occupation of Major Roads to advance toward Central Region (Riyadh). Red Country Forces are expected to have the Initial Aerial Superiority. The Blue country has tried several direct and indirect media and political means to deter Red Country from its aggressive intents without positive response. As result, Blue country has raised the alert status and mass its military forces on its eastern borders in anticipation of military escalation and to encounter possible threat. The International Society tried to convince them to discontinue enriching Uranium by forcing escalating Sanctions to encourage them to stop the enrichment process. Red Country has threatened if its Nuclear Facilities are attacked, countries in the region – in general – will suffer from its reaction and it will target all Western interests, the Military Bases in the region and will close Naval Straits, in addition, it will target Blue country Key Train and Oil, Economic and Military installations, especially those in Eastern and Central Regions using Missile or Aerial attacks, or some of the Land and Naval operations.

We have Information about Enemy Objectives as follows:

a)     Occupation of Oil Fields in the Eastern Region.

b)     Threatening Riyadh (the Blue Country Political Capital) by using Land Forces.

c)      Conduct Sabotage Operations in the Vital Installations and Major Cities.

d)     Destabilize Security and propagate Chaos and Disruption.

e)     Instigate the Public Opinion against Blue Country.

f)        Consolidate its existence in the Arabian Gulf along Coasts by establishing Naval Bases and Anti-Ship Rocket Launcher Platforms.

g)     Work on developing its Nuclear Program and Uranium Enrichment to possess Nuclear Weapon.

Formation: see Enclosure (2) Enemy Forces Order of Battle.

Enemy Forces Activities:

1)     The Enemy conducted Air RECON by using UAVs along Sector of the Area.

2)     Destabilizing Security and Economy and propagate Chaos.

3)     Infilteration of Elements sympathized with the Threat Country to sabotage the Kingdom Infrastructure and Oil, Gas and Water Pipelines.

1. 2.             Intelligence Requirements:

1. Priority of Intelligence Requirements:

1)     Will Terrorist Organization attempt sabotage and cause disruption of natural resources production (oil/gas/water), power generation stations and grids, and pipe lines/transport facilities within the CENTRAL Region? If so, when, where, and with what forces?

2)     Where are the Terrorist Organization safe havens in the CENTRAL Region?

3)     What are the quantities and types of weapons; and where are the storage places for Terrorist Organization weapons in the CENTRAL Region?

4)     What is the support base in the local community for the Terrorist Organization?

5)     Have there been any threats within Area of Operations (AO)?

1. Other Intelligence Requirements:

1)       Are there unusual crowds assembling or demonstrating within your AO?

2)       Have there been any stolen/suspicious vehicles reported in your AO?

3)       Have any vehicles or personnel turned away from checkpoints immediately after having identified check points as government control points?

4)       Has anyone attempted to use false identification cards/badges to gain access to military or vital installations?

5)       Has sniping been reported in your AO?

6)       If there has been a local curfew in effect, have unauthorized vehicular or personnel movements been observed/reported?

1. 3.             Intelligence Acquisition Tasks:

1. Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units. Report to S2 as obtained:

1)       Any sight of Enemy Forces: (Strength, Disposition, Composition).

2)       Attempted sabotage and/or disruption of natural resources production (oil/gas/water) within the CENTRAL Region and EASTERN Province?

3)       Theft of weapons, munitions, identification cards, badges, uniforms, and other SANG-related materiels.

4)       Terrorist Organization safe havens in your AO.

5)       Terrorist Organization caches and storage locations, to include quantities and types of weapons and equipment found.

6)       Unusual crowds assembling or demonstrating within your AO

1. Requests to Higher Command, Adjacent and Cooperating Units:

1)         RSAF: Request aerial photographic products of Central Region vital installations within CAC AOR. Update as situation requires.

2)         Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF): Request all relevant intelligence of Terrorist Organization cells reportedly involved in amphibious landing operations in the EASTERN Province. Update immediately.

3)         RSLF: Request disposition, composition, strength, and current activities of Terrorist Organization cells operating within RSLF AORs in close proximity to SANG units.

4)         MOI: Request providing information about Suspected Activities around Vital Objectives in SANG Sector or arrest Persons that could be from Special Missions Battalion.

1. 4.                 Measures for Handling Personnel, Documents, and Materials:

1. Prisoners of War, Surrenders and Deserters:

1)         Prisoners of War with information on Terrorist Organization regarding TIC weapons, Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), and/or bomb-making or related activities will be segregated and reported to this headquarters (ATTN: Intelligence Directorate, SANG HQ) as soon as possible.

2)         Enemy Forces Officers from Major and above or Pilots will be reported to POW Collection Point as soon as possible.

1. Captured Documents:

1)         Any Terrorist Organization documents pertaining to computers, mobile phones and radios, to include mobile phone numbers/information, radio equipment operation, communications-electronics technical information or frequencies of radios will be delivered immediately to this headquarters (ATTN: Intelligence Directorate, SANG HQ).

2)         Captured Material. Terrorist Organization captured communications equipment (computers, mobile phones and radios) will be evacuated immediately to this headquarters (ATTN: Intelligence Directorate, SANG HQ). Equipment that is serviceable, such as automobiles and trucks will be evacuated/secured in place for forensic/technical inspection.

1. 5.                 Required Documents and Equipment:

1. Maps:

Scale: 1:50,000

 Scale: 1:250,000

1. Aerial Photos:

(1).   Photos are distributed based on its availability and coverage of SANG AO.

(2).   Requests should be submitted to get the Aerial Photos when needed to SANG G2 NLT (Hr 1500) prior to day of flying mission to cover the requested area.

1. References:

(1).   OPFOR Operations 100-61

(2).   OPFOR Operations (conventional forces) 100-62.

(3).   OPFOR Organization Guide 100-64.

(4).   OPFOR Battle 100-7 (to benefit from organization and weapon systems, their ranges and features).

1. 6.                  Counter Intelligence:
   

1. Classified information security:

(1).   SANG Plans and Operation Orders.

(2).   Units Plans and Operation Orders.

(3).   Signal Operating Instructions Pamphlets, passwords and challenge.

(4).   Military maps and overlays that contain Operations Plans and locations of our forces.

(5).   Any missing of what is mentioned above must be reported immediately to SANG G2.

1. 7.                  Reports and Distribution:
   

1. Reports:

All units must send INTEL/Information reports IAW times and forms listed in SANG HQ Combat Operations SOPs unless directed otherwise.

1. Distribution:

IAW SANG HQ Combat Operations SOPs.

1. 8.                  Various instructions:
   

1. INTSUM must be sent to SANG G2 NLT 1500 daily. All information will be updated and INTSUM will be sent back to the Associated Units NLT 0800 the next day.

1. Any request of information from Higher HQ must be through the authorized INTEL forms.

Enclosures:

Enclosure (1) AO analysis to Annex (b) Intelligence to OPLAN (Ruhhayat) 1433H-1a

Enclosure (2) OPFOR Battle System

Enclosure (aa) AO Map

Enclosure (bb) Light Data

BG/                                                                                       MG/

Khalid Al-Shunifi                                                                  Faisal Al-Shatir

Intelligence Operations and Plans                                                G2

Department Manager

Enclosure (1) AO analysis to Annex (b) Intelligence

to OPLAN (Ruhhayat) 1433H-1a

References: OPLAN

1. Purpose, Mission and Restrictive Factors:
   1. Purpose :

To analyze and evaluate AO to provide Commanders and Intelligence Officers information on the Significant Environmental and Climatic Features of the Brigade AO in terms of their impact on Military Operations.

1. Mission:

SANG Units (Task Organization) SANG units (Task Organization) conduct Combat Operations in the East of Riyadh and Security Operation in all the designated AOs to repulse the Enemy and prevent it from reaching the city and conduct Specified Security Missions in all the cities in which SANG Units exist at to provide Security and Stability and develop the situation on order

1. General Description of the area.

1. Weather and climate.

1)       Climate: will be issued daily by SANG G2.

2)       Weather: will be issued daily by SANG G2.

Table (cc) Light Data

3)       Precipitation: the possibility of Precipitation is15%.

4)       Fog.  Light, low-lying fog in the early morning hours and dissipating after an hour of sunrise.

5)       Temperature. High 25°C; Low 15°C.

6)       Surface Wind: is from northwest 5 – 10 km/hr.

7)       Cloudiness. Early morning overcast possible and dissipate after 1000 hours daily.

8)       Visibility. From 10-15 KM.

9)       Air Pressure. Based on the Daily Weather Report.

10)   Humidity. The Average is 30%.

1. Terrain

1)     Relief and Drainage Systems.

a)    AO Geography

(1)            There are no permanent rivers or bodies of water in the Area of Operations. Wadis contain water only after rain and for a short period of time.

(2)            The terrain is generally flat. There are Mountains cannot be climbed (60% of Slope) and Isolated Heights cannot be crossed by the Vehicles, the area Grids QN300530-QN300545-QN346558.

b)    Vegetation. Small shrubs scattered in AO and some Seasonal Bushes that are not considered a big obstacle for our forces.

c)    Surface Crust. The area is generally Sandy punctuated by some of the rocky parts that are heavily scattered around the area.

d)    Manmade features:

(1) Roads.

Al-Hofuf (Old) – Riyadh

Dammam – Riyadh Highway

(2) Railroad

Riyadh – Dammam

(3) Cities and Villages

Khurais

Saad

Al- Wasia

Al-Dughm

(4) Sandy Areas

Ruhhayat

Ad Dahna

Al- Aerma

(5) Industrial Installations

Al- Wasia Water Project

Oil Sorting Labs

Radio Station

Electricity Stations

Aramco Housing

Oil Pumping Stations

(6) Made-up Features

Microwave Tower (1) – at Grid (QN213579

Microwave Tower (2) – at Grid (QN386600

Old Riyadh-Dammam Highway that extends from North-East of Riyadh to approximately Grid QN0600 then turns to the East towards Dammam.

2)     The military aspect for the region

a)   Tactical Aspects

(1) Weather status

Weather is not expected to provide any cover against Air or Ground Observation except the times of limited Visibility caused by Strong Winds and Sand Storms.

(2) Terrain:

The area is desert that provides Wide Fields of Fire and good observation especially on the hills. In Higher Ground, the high peaks provide a good observation but do not provide Field of Fire due to many reefs and Wadis.

(3) Vegetation:

There is no high Vegetation or forests in the area that limit visibility except Small Shrubs and Farms that will not affect observation and fields of fire ranges.

b) Cover and Concealment

(1) Weather:

Weather is not expected to affect Cover and Concealment only in temporary situations such as Sand and Dust Storms.

(2) Terrain Features:

The area is an open desert but there are some main obstacles:

Otishan Wadi: at grid QN3257 north-east to grid QN3967

Saad Wadi: at grid QN3758 east to grid QN4359

Atshanat Al-Jafi Wadi: at grid QN3758 east to grid QN4359

(3) Vegetation:

Vegetation is not expected to provide Cover and Concealment generally in the area except little farms scattered in the area.

(4) Manmade features:

There are no manmade features in the area that could provide Cover and Concealment except the cities and villages.

c)   Obstacles:

(1) Weather:

There is no effect of Weather on Movement except in the Heavy Sand and Dust Storms Situations.

(2) Terrain:

Terrain is not expected to be an obstacle because the area is an Open Desert.

(3) Vegetation:

Vegetation won’t delay Movement.

(4)            Surface Crust:

The ground is good for Vehicle Movement and Airborne Operations although there are some Sandy parts that delay Vehicles Movement and we need Engineer Effort.

d)   Avenues of approach

(1) Enemy Avenues of Approach.

(a)  Hofuf – Riyadh Old Highway.

(b)  Dammam – Riyadh Highway.

(c)   Pipelines Road (grids QN1828-QN2229-QN3053-QN3434-QN3935-QN4341-QN6050-QN77757) this is Oil Pipelines Service Road. (One Lane) with Surrounding Wide Maneuver Area that accommodates two BNs at least with good dispersion.

(d)  Saad Wadi (grids QN360573-QN380585-QN42588). This is a Wadi that accommodates one deployed BN.

(2)     Our Forces Avenues of Approach.

(a)  Hofuf – Riyadh Old Highway.

(b)  Dammam – Riyadh Highway.

Enclosure 2 OPFOR Order of Battle

18^th Brigade Tactical Group

Enclosure 2 OPFOR Order of Battle:

Formation:

1. Three Mechanized Infantry Battalion.
2. Tank Battalion.
3. Anti-Armor Battalion.
4. Reconnaissance Company.
5. Signal Company.
6. Artillery Battalion.
7. Air Defense Battalion.
8. NBC Company.
9. Special Forces Company.
10. Engineer Company.
11. CSS Company.
12. Maintenance Company.
13. Light Infantry Platoon.

SECRET FOR TRAINING

B-13

Gerelateerde informatie:

Britam defence hacked, confidential documents leaked, site offline

Update: Full report here

A British defence company has been breached and as a result a heap of documents have been published online and now the site has gone offline.

The attack is on britam defence (http://www.britamdefence.com/) and  has been claimed by a hacker using the handle JAsIrX who uploaded the leaked information to various file sharing websites and released it via a single pastebin post with the a message about the release (see bottom).

The documents come in 6 parts and total over 423MB compress zip files and inside the compress files appears to be a common layout of three main folders named !!Syria, Iran and Iraq.

Inside these appear to be documents like passports, incident reports about drunk employees which are labelled private and confidential as well.

A quick look into the files shows shocking plans for chemical warfare attacks where they have planned to lure victims to kill zones. The file can be found in the Iran folder under OPLAN (Ruhayyat) 1433H-1.doc.

Move from their garrisons to occupy AA at Grid (1556) (IAW Movement Order).
On order defend in the designated sector from Grid (378477) to Grid (275408).
Facilitate the passage of the Screening Force through PP (1, 2).
Fix Enemy forces and lure them to the Killing Zones.
On order conduct Counter Attack.
Support Reserves when they conduct deep operations.

Lees verder: http://www.cyberwarnews.info/2013/01/24/britam-defence-hacked-confidential-documents-leaked-site-offline/

Zij die deze documenten toegestuurd willen krijgen om zelf verder te bestuderen kunnen een verzoek daartoe indienen aan arend@argusoog.org.

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